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JUSTICE IN THE UNIVERSITY: 
LEGAL A VENUES FOR STUDENTS 
CYNTHIA L. CHEWTERt 
Universities have developed elaborate administrative procedures relating to 
academic appeals and the discipline of students. When making decisions that 
affect individual students, universities are accountable to the courts through 
judicial review, actions in contract or tort, and under human rights legislation. 
Inadequate attention to the procedural requirements of natural justice by 
universities and undue deference by the courts to university autonomy have 
rendered judicial review a poor and ineffective guarantor of natural justice. 
An aggrieved student is advised to seek redress in the law of contract or 
through human rights legislation. Procedural reform by universities and less 
deference to these institutions on the part of the courts would better reflect 
the important interest a student has in the completion of his or her education. 
Les universites ont developpe des procedures administratives elaborees en 
matiere d'appel academique et disciplinaire pour !es etudiants. Lorsque !es 
universites prennent des decisions qui ajfectent !es droits des etudiants, elles 
en sont responsables devant !es cours de justice sur la base du controle judicial 
en dommages contractuels ou extra-contractuels et en vertu de la legislation 
des droits de la personne. Une attention inadequate quant aux exigences 
procedurales des regles de justice nature/le, ainsi qu 'une pratique de la 
retenue judiciaire malencontrue par !es cours de justice envers !es universites, 
font en sorte que le controle judicial clans le context universitaire est inejficace. 
Un etudiant mecontent est avise de diriger sa requete en droit contractuel OU 
en droits de la personne. Une riforme des procedures administratives des 
universites ainsi qu 'un degre amoindri de retenue judiciaire a !'egard des 
decisions de ces institutions rejleteront mieux !'importance des interets qu 'un 
etudiant possede a completer ses etudes. 
t Director, Dalhousie Student Advocacy Service; B .A. (Toronto), B .A. (Mc-
Master), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
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Canadian universities have set up elaborate administrative schemes 
in order to respect the rules of natural justice when making decisions 
that affect individual students. Universities are held accountable for 
these decisions in a number of ways, including judicial review, suits 
in contract and tort, and through human rights legislation. To date 
in Canada, little scholarly attention has been given to examining the 
impact that the administrative decision-making structure of univer-
sities has on students. 1 Even less attention has been given to the 
manner in which the courts have enforced the procedural guarantees 
necessary to ensure that university decisions are made in accordance 
with the principles of natural justice. This paper provides an 
overview, a starting point for debate, as to whether, and how effec-
tively, universities and the courts are giving effect to the require-
ments of procedural justice in relation to students.2 
Any assessment of the current system is directly dependent on 
how one characterizes the interest a student has in his or her educa-
tion. The universities and the courts tend to view post-secondary 
education as a privilege and grant a level of natural justice commen-
surate with the removal of a privilege. This view undervalues the 
student's interest in completing an education. An appropriate level 
of procedural justice must recognize the serious and permanent con-
sequences of expulsion and the great interest a student has in com-
pleting his or her education. If one accepts this estimation of a stu-
dent's interest then there is every reason to be concerned with the sta-
tus quo. 
This paper will contend that inadequate protections at the uni-
versity level and undue deference by the courts to university auton-
omy have created a system in which students can have little confi-
dence. In Part I, the external and internal structure of universities is 
examined, and an outline of the general regulatory powers vested in 
universities is provided. Part II examines natural justice in the uni-
versity context. It surveys both caselaw and the procedural guaran-
1 For an interesting, if dated, look at the legal nature of the university-student 
relationship, see C. B. Lewis, "The Legal Nature of a University and the Student-
University Relationship" (1983) 15 Ottawa L.R. 249. 
2 Quite a large body of caselaw and some literature exist on the requirements 
of natural justice in a university's relations with its teaching staff. Because of the 
specialized relationship of professors with universities, this body of law stands 
apart from the law and procedures applicable to students; no attempt has been 
made to compare the two here. 
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tees currently in place in various Canadian universities.3 This section 
concludes with an evaluation of the procedural fairness offered by 
judicial review in the university context. The paper then turns, in 
Parts III and IV, to other avenues of legal protection available to 
students in either contracts and torts, or under human rights legisla-
tion. The final section contains recommendations for improving the 
present situation. 
I. THE ExTERNAL AND INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF 
UNIVERSITIES 
G. H. L. Fridman mused that universities are "curious bodies."4 On 
the one hand they are legal, self-governing corporations that enter 
into contractual relations with faculty, staff, and students. Disputes 
arising from these relations can be resolved in the courts in the same 
way as any other contractual matter. 
On the other hand, significant differences exist between the uni-
versity and its corporate cousins. Universities are created through 
legislative acts, are funded almost completely by the state, and 
serve a public purpose: the education of the state's citizens.5 They 
are also professional bodies, and their decisions to admit or to ex-
pel students give them a unique monopoly over the entrance to all 
professions. Universities are public, statutory institutions subject to 
judicial review by the courts on an administrative law basis, 6 and 
like many administrative bodies, universities are perceived by the 
3 The 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendars of the following nine universities 
were selected: University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, Brock 
University, McMaster University, Memorial University, Queen's University, 
Saint Mary's University, University of Western Ontario, and York University. 
The universities were selected at random, with the exception that an effort was 
made to include the regulations of universities in several provinces and to 
include regulations of larger and smaller institutions. For Dalhousie 
University, the 1993-94 Dentistry, Law and Medicine Calendar was used. Because 
the university has standardized procedures at Senate level, this would not affect 
the results of the sample. 
4 G. H. L. Fridman, "Judicial Intervention into University Affairs" (1973) 21 
Chitty's L.J. 181 at 181. 
5 For a thorough history and analysis of the role of the university in Canadian 
society, see the dissent of Wilson, J. in McKinney v. Board of Governors of the 
University of Guelph et al., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 320-417 [hereinafter 
McKinney]. 
6 Fridman, supra note 4 at 181-182. 
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courts as having considerable expertise. Courts have been especially 
deferential when reviewing university decisions on matters concern-
ing education and the granting of degrees. 
A university is created by a public or private act of the legisla-
ture,? with varying degrees of detail as to how it is to be governed.s 
An examination of the statutes that create Dalhousie University 
serves to illustrate the governing structure of Canadian universities 
in general. Dalhousie's statutes are a collection of private Acts 
dating back to 1820.9 Currently, those Acts create a body corporate 
to be known as Dalhousie College and University, at Halifax. 
General regulation and control of the University is vested in a 
Board of Governors having "all usual powers and authorities as 
such."Io The members of the Board are either appointed by the 
government of Nova Scotia, or elected from constituencies of 
alumni, students, and others. 1 I As head of a body corporate, the 
Board is the body that is capable of suing and being sued, of con-
tracting with various parties, and of managing the finances of the 
University. 
7 Some univers1t1t1es are incorporated by Royal Charter, e.g. McGill 
University in 1821. 
8 Some statutes create only a broad general framework; others are "more or less 
comprehensive attempts to regulate all aspects of university life." See for 
example the Acts creating Dalhousie University S.N.S. 1863, c. 23 as amended; 
and Saint Mary's University S.N.S. 1970, c. 147 as amended. Other provinces have 
one statute which governs the incorporation of all universities within the 
province. See e.g. the Universities Acts of British Columbia and Alberta. See 
Lewis, supra note 1 at 249-251. 
9 A Bill to Incorporate the Governors of the Dalhousie College, at Halifax, S.N.S. 
1820, c. 39, repealed 1863. An Act for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie 
College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24, as amended. An Act Relating to Dalhousie College and 
University, S.N.S. 1967, c. 133, as amended. An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts 
of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1969, c. 
127. An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and 
Support of Dalhousie College and Chapter 104 of the Acts of 1935, An Act Relating to 
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74. See Lewis, supra note 1at250. 
IO An Act for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24, 
s. l, as amended. 
11 Dalhousie University, Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and 
Medicine Calendar at 5. See also An Act for the Regulation and Support of 
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24, s. 1. 
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Internal regulation of the University is vested in the Senate, sub-
ject to approval by the Board. 12 The Act specifically gives the 
Senate authority to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over students 
and includes the power to fine, suspend, and expel. In addition, the 
Senate is given authority to delegate these responsibilities to any 
"person or body of persons," subject to those conditions it considers 
proper. 13 The Senate determines its own composition under s. IA of 
the Act, and currently consists of the President, Vice-Presidents, 
Registrar, Deans of faculties, academic department heads, full pro-
fessors, and elected members representing other faculty members 
and students respectively. 14 The Senate (or committees thereof) 
hears and decides cases at first instance as well as appeals from 
lower levels. Avenues of appeal are deemed exhausted after the 
adoption of a committee's decision by the Senate as a whole. 
Therefore, it appears that the Board of Governors exercises its su-
pervisory jurisdiction over the Senate only with regard to policy, 
and not individual cases. 15 
The President of the University is the Chief Executive Officer. 
He or she derives authority from, and is responsible to, the Board of 
Governors and the Senate for supervision of the university's admin-
istrative and academic work. In practice, the President of Dalhousie 
University also assumes an ad hoc jurisdiction over non-academic 
discipline at the university, a jurisdiction further delegated to the 
Deans of the various faculties, who exercise it with the knowledge 
and consent of the President on a case-by-case basis. 16 
12 An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and 
Support of Dalhousie College and Chapter 104 of the Acts of 1935, An Act Relating to 
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74, s. 2. 
13 An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and 
Support of Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1969, c. 127, s. 1(2); amending s. 7 of the Act 
of 1863 by adding to its. 7(2). 
14 Dalhousie University, Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and 
Medicine Calendar at 5. See An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts of 1863, An Act 
for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie College and Chapter 104 of the Acts of 
1935, An Act Relating to Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74, s. 2. 
l5 See e.g. Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals" [unpublished]; and Miraliakbari v. 
Dalhousie College and University (1989), 39 Admin. L.R. 102 (N.S.S.C. T.D.). 
l6 This delegation is not reflected in any formal policy of Dalhousie 
University; an ad hoc Senate Committee has been struck to create a policy 
regarding non-academic discipline, but has not yet reported to the Senate with 
conclusions. 
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Some universities' statutes also provide for a visitor. This is an 
ancient institution in which an important figure, such as the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Province or the Bishop,17 is appointed to 
oversee the internal matters of ecclesiastical, civil, or eleemosynary 
corporations. 18 Where the office of the visitor exists, appeals by any 
member of the university may be taken to him or her as a last resort. 
The office of the visitor originated as an ecclesiastical institu-
tion for the purpose of supervising the government of the church, but 
its connection to universities is equally venerable. 19 The visitor's 
role in relation to a university is: 
(a) to hear and adjudicate upon all claims and complaints 
concerning the internal affairs of the corporation made by 
the corporators, and (b) to appoint and remove the mem-
bers and officers of the corporation.20 
Given "the antiquity of the office and the rarity of its exer-
cise,"21 the powers of a visitor and the procedures under which he or 
she operates are unclear. Some aspects of the visitor's role have been 
spelled out. The visitor may exercise jurisdiction either as the 
result of an appeal or on his or her own initiative.22 The visitor must 
observe the basic tenets of natural justice, and absent a breach of 
those rules, the visitor's authority is exhaustive, final, and unre-
viewable by the courts.23 
In theory, the visitor seems to be a detached figure charged with 
the neutral oversight of university decisions and policies. In recent 
times, the role of the visitor has been largely irrelevant because the 
appointed person cannot practically carry out the functions of the of-
fice. 24 The only significance of the visitor today is that, where the 
office exists, the courts have declined jurisdiction to hear student 
!7 W. Ricquier, "The University Visitor" (1978) 4 Dal. L.J. 647 at 651-653. 
!8 J. W. Bridge, "Keeping Peace in the Universities: The Role of the Visitor" 
(1970) 86 L.Q.R. 531; see also Ricquier, ibid. 
19 Bridge, ibid. at 532. 
20 Ibid. at 538. 
21 Ricquier, supra note 17 at 677. 
22 Bridge, supra note 18 at 536. 
23 Ibid at 544. 
24 Until the eighteenth century, the powers of the visitor were personally exer-
cised .by the office-holder, but at least from the mid-nineteenth century it 
appeared that the powers of the visitor could be delegated. Ricquier, supra note 17 
at 678--679. 
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appeals.25 Some courts have expressed appreciation for the office, 
commenting that recourse to internal appeals, including to the visi-
tor, are more appropriate forums for students than the courts because 
of economy, convenience, and speed of resolution. 26 At least two 
scholars have looked at the office in a similar but cautiously opti-
mistic manner, concluding that if the office can be brought into the 
twentieth century intact, it may still be useful.27 
The office of the visitor has long been abolished in all but a few 
Canadian universities. 28 Those that retain the office would do well 
to either follow suit and abolish it, or update the office so that it 
becomes meaningful. One possible way to revive the role would be 
to retain the office, but ensure that legally trained arbitrators, and 
not ceremonial figures, are appointed to the office. There is some 
precedent for this. Where no express nomination as to who would as-
sume the visitorial office was made, it has been held that visitorial 
powers are to be exercised in the Court of Chancery.2 9 
Unfortunately, neither abolition nor revival of the office of the visi-
tor is likely in the foreseeable future; the office is statutorily cre-
ated and any change must come from the provincial legislature. 
II. NATURAL JUSTICE 
IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT 
Students can become engaged in the appeals processes of a univer-
sity through academic appeals, academic discipline and non-aca-
25 See Langloisv. Rector and Members of Laval University (1973), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 
67 4 (Que. C.A.); Prokopchuk v. University of Saskatchewan et al (1985), 12 Admin 
L.R. 123 (Sask. Q.B.); Blasserv. Royallnstitution for the Advancement of Learning et 
al. (1985), 16 Admin. L.R. 298 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter Blasser]; Wong v. 
University of Toronto et al. (1989), 45 Admin. LR. 113 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) 
[hereinafter Wong (1989)]. 
26 Blasser, ibid. at 310. 
27 Bridge, supra note 18; Ricquier, supra note 17. 
28 Dalhousie abolished the office in 1863 by repealing the statute that created 
the office and substituting another which made no mention of a visitor. 
However, at the University of Toronto, all powers not expressly delegated were 
vested in the Board of Trustees, and this was held to include visitorial powers. See 
Wong (1989), supra note 25. Three other universities that have retained the office 
into the 1990's are Laval University, McGill University, and the University of 
Saskatchewan. 
29 Ricquier, supra note 17 at 651, commenting on the decision in The King v. 
The Bishop of Ely (1788), 100 E.R. 157 (K.B.). 
112 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
demic discipline. Academic appeals concern, inter alia, course re-
quirements, regulations, fitness requirements, and the reassessment 
of grades. They are normally initiated by the student in response to 
a grievance that has not been worked out (either formally or infor-
mally) at the departmental level. Appeals of these decisions nor-
mally go to faculty-level committees, and then on to a Senate 
Committee, the decisions of which are voted on by the Senate as a 
whole.3° Further recourse is had either to the visitor or to the courts. 
As a university is also charged with maintaining internal aca-
demic and non-academic discipline, it will have jurisdiction to 
prosecute allegations of academic and non-academic offences. Non-
academic offences are often handled through the office of the 
President, regardless of whether this power is explicitly delegated 
or not. Academic offences, such as cheating and plagiarism, remain 
within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Some universities provide for 
several levels of appeal up to the Senate; others direct all such alle-
gations to the Senate at first instance.31 
As public bodies susceptible to judicial review, universities 
must observe the requirements of natural justice when exercising 
their regulatory powers. 
The Availability of Prerogative Writs 
The question of whether the writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohi-
bition are available to students seeking judicial review of a universi-
ty's decision(s) was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Kingv. University of Saskatchewan.32 The Court 
held that the three requirements for prerogative writs were met: 
namely, that the body was statutorily created and authorized to act; 
that its duties were in the nature of public duties; and, that the 
duties were judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.33 
Since then, it has never been doubted that judicial review of uni-
versity decisions is available and the cases have turned on whether 
the writs should in fact issue under the circumstances. 
30 Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals" [unpublished]. 
3l Dalhousie's Senate is an example of a body that has not delegated such dis-
ciplinary powers. 
32 (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter King},. 
33 Ibid. at 125. 
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Requirements of Natural Justice and the Standard of Review 
The general rule as to whether, and to what extent, the rules of natu-
ral justice apply in any given case depend on "the circumstances of 
the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal 
is acting, the subject matter which is being dealt with, and so 
forth."3 4 This idea has been restated as importing on tribunals a 
general duty to act fairly depending on (a) the nature of the deci-
sion, (b) the relationship between the administrative body and the 
individual and (c) the effect of the decision on the individual's 
rights.35 All statutory bodies have a duty to act fairly. An implied 
condition of the legislature's delegation of power is that the power 
will be exercised in a fair manner.36 
One would think that a high degree of natural justice or proce-
dural fairness would apply to university academic and disciplinary 
tribunals. The decisions of these tribunals are directed against stu-
dents individually, unlike university regulations which have general 
application. Tribunal decisions involve issues of competence, fit-
ness, and punishment. The effect on the student of an adverse deci-
sion may be the deprivation of the career for which the student was 
in training, and render useless any previous academic success in that 
program. It may foreclose further university education entirely. 
Yet the courts have shown extreme deference to universities in 
their academic and disciplinary capacity. In Re Hare/kin and 
University of Regina, Beetz, J. held that the legislature, by empower-
ing the university Senate to hear appeals, indicated that "the courts 
should be slow to intervene in university affairs by means of discre-
tionary writs whenever it is still possible for the university to cor-
rect its errors."37 Somehow, Beetz, J.'s qualified statement has been 
translated into something quite different. It would not be incorrect 
to say that exhaustion of university level appeals is almost a pre-
condition of judicial review. The courts have also consistently 
34 Dickson, J. (as he then was) dissenting in Kane v. Board of Governors of the 
University of British Columbia (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 311 at 322 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter Kane], quoting Tucker, L.J. in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk et. al., 
[1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at 118. 
35 Hillv. University College of Cape Breton et al., (1991) 104 N.S.R. (2d) 285 at 
290 (N.S.S.C. T.D.). 
3G Re Polten and Governing Council of the University of Toronto et al. ( 197 5), 8 
O.R. (2d) 749 at 759 [hereinafter Re Polten]. 
37 (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14 at 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Re Hare/kin]. 
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applied a very low standard of natural justice in their efforts to de-
fer to university decisions. 
The Ontario District Court based the rationale for deference on 
entirely different reasons in Wong (1989), ten years after Re 
Hare/kin. There it was held that the court's reluctance to interfere is 
based on the special relationship of members of a university, the 
importance of academic independence, and the special expertise of 
university tribunals.38 
Nevertheless, the courts have been willing to apply a high stan-
dard of justice to professors and officials of the university because 
that "is required when the right to continue in one's profession or 
employment is at stake."39 So far, Healeyv. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland is the only decision to apply this standard to a stu-
dent. 
Judicial review for violations of natural justice is normally con-
fined to a review of procedure. It is clear that the courts will not 
conduct a substantive review of the merits of a student's case:40 
[T]he standards for a degree, and the assessment of a stu-
dent's work, are so clearly vested in a university that the 
Courts have no power to intervene merely because it is 
thought that the standards are too high, or that the stu -
dent's work was inaccurately assessed.41 
The court will only review the record when it finds there have been 
"flagrant violations"42 or "obvious denials"43 of natural justice, or 
where the procedures involved were "manifestly unfair"44 or 
38 Wong {1989), supra note 25 at 129. 
39 Kane, supra note 34; Healeyv. Memorial University of Newfoundland (1992), 
St. J. No.4305 (QL) (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Healey]. 
40 Hague v. Senate of the University of British Columbia (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 
150 (B.C.S.C.). 
41 Re Polten, supra note 36 at 758, Weatherston, J. for the Court. 
42 Paine v. University of Toronto et al. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 770 at 776-777 
(C.A.) [hereinafter Paine]; Bilson et al. v. University of Saskatchewan (1984), 9 
Admin. LR. 196 at 223 (Sask. CA.). 
43 Morgan v. Board of Governors of Acadia University et al. (1985), 15 Admin. 
LR. 61 at 83 (N.S.S.C. T.D.). 
44 Bennettv. Wilfted Laurier University et al. (1983), 15 Admin. LR. 42 at 48 
(Ont. Sup. Ct. (Div. Ct.)). 
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"manifestly and flagrantly contrary"45 to the principles of natural 
justice. 
Re Polten46 is authority for the proposition that a failure of 
natural justice in a lower tribunal cannot be cured on appeal unless 
the appeal is actually a trial de novo. In a de novo hearing the re-
viewing body does not exercise purely appellate functions but de-
cides the matter afresh. Unless no procedures for a de novo hearing 
exist,47 the court will allow the university an opportunity to "correct 
it's errors"4S before undertaking any judicial review. 
In one exceptional case, the court ruled that even a de novo hear-
ing would not be sufficient because of bias.49 This is a logical ex-
tension of the rule regarding failures of natural justice being "cured" 
on appeal; if the appellate body is not capable of granting a de novo 
hearing in accordance with natural justice, it is no appeal at all. 
Only one case reviewed the merits of a tribunal's decision based 
on the "patently unreasonable" standard and the decision in question 
was a procedural one: to maintain disciplinary jurisdiction over a 
student after the professor who lodged a complaint had withdrawn 
it.5° In that case a writ of prohibition issued to prevent the disci-
pline committee from considering the matter further. 
In sum, the courts will only exercise judicial review over univer-
sity tribunals and bodies where: 
(a) all internal levels of appeal are exhausted, or the uni-
versity is unable to conduct a de novo hearing in ac-
cordance with natural justice, and 
(b) any decisions already made were undertaken after a 
dear or flagrant violation of natural justice, or 
(c) the decision reached by the tribunal, while within its 
jurisdiction, was patently unreasonable. 
This paper will now turn to an examination of the substantive 
aspects of natural justice. 
45 Archerv. Universite de Moncton (1992), 9 Admin. L.R. (2d) 200 at 201 
(N.B.S.C.). 
46 Supra note 36 at 767-768. See also Re Hare/kin, supra note 37 at 27-29. 
47 Re Polten, supra note 36; Re Harelkin, supra note 37; Paine, supra note 42. 
48 Re Harelkin, supra note 37 at 57. 
49 Healey, supra note 39; see also Sharma v. University of Calgary (1990), 71 
D.L.R. (4th) 344 (Alta. Q.B.). 
so Aylwardv. McMaster University (1991), 47 Admin. L.R. 198 at 205-206 
(Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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Audi Alteram Partem: The Opportunity to be Heard 
The audi alteram partem rule is often cited as shorthand for the re-
quirement that a person be heard, but inherent in this are several 
other rights attendant on a hearing. These other rights may or may 
not be required in any given case. Loosely, they are the rights to no-
tice, disclosure, a hearing, counsel, cross-examination, and reasons 
for the decision. The requirements that natural justice imposes on 
university tribunals and decision-makers regarding each of these ar-
eas will be examined in turn. 
i. Notice 
Notice is one of the preconditions to the audi alteram partem rule in 
the sense that without notice, a party is unable to exercise any other 
procedural guarantees. While notice has never been the main issue in 
a student's appeal to the courts, the courts have consistently deter-
mined that university appeals and disciplinary decisions affect the 
rights of students in such a manner that notice is required.5 1 
Despite this, few universities even state how notice is to be ef-
fected. Some dispense with notice entirely by permitting a Dean to 
exercise discretion to ban a "dangerous" student from the campus.52 
Many universities specify that notice of proceedings against a 
student will' be mailed to the student's last known address, but that 
the university will maintain jurisdiction and deal with a student in 
absentia if no reply is made within a given time.53 The most 
comprehensive provisions regarding notice are found in the 
University of Alberta Calendar, which requires that notices be sent 
by double-registered mail or hand-delivered.54 Unfortunately, this 
rule only applies to communication of a penalty, and not to the ini-
tiation of proceedings. 
5! See e.g. Re Harelkin, supra note 37; Hill v. University College of Cape Breton 
et al., supra note 35. 
52 See e.g. University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.12 at 
59. 
53 See e.g. Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations 
(Undergraduates)," Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 
W,at65. 
54 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.5 at 
56. 
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ii. Disclosure 
Disclosure of a university's case against a student is necessary in or-
der for the student to be able to reply to it effectively, yet the re-
quirement of disclosure has been somewhat watered down by the 
courts in university situations. Bennettv. Wi(fred Laurier University 
et af.55 set the minimum threshold at disclosure of "the substance of 
the allegations in sufficient detail to enable [a person] to respond." 
The court went on to note that this did not necessarily involve a 
right to hear the actual evidence, cross-examine the witnesses, or 
even have the names of the witnesses. 
Courts have held that a committee may not act on an ex parte 
basis by holding private interviews with witnesses, or hear evidence 
in the absence of a party.56 It is not dear whether later disclosure of 
this evidence by the committee will cure a violation. In Kane, 
Dickson, J. (as he then was) seemed to think that there would be no 
violation of natural justice where the committee allowed the parties 
to respond to the new evidence.57 
Archer v. Universite de Moncton5 8 dealt with the timing of dis-
closure. In that case the student was given an unfavourable report for 
the first time at the hearing. The court held that, as long as the stu-
dent was given time to read the report and did not request an ad-
journment, natural justice had been observed. 
At minimum then, a university must disclose the substance of 
any allegation against a student which a person or committee plans 
to use in coming to a decision, although the disclosure need not take 
place until the hearing itself. 
The universities have taken several different positions on disclo-
sure. At Memorial University, a student charged with an academic 
offence is informed in writing of the "nature of the case," but an op-
portunity to respond directly to his or her accusers is not guaran-
teed.59 In contrast, at Dalhousie University, provision exists for the 
Senate Academic Appeals Committee to require the disclosure of 
55 Supra note 44 at 47. 
56 Kane, supra note 34 at 322. 
5? Ibid. at 323, citing R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Com 'r, Ex.p. Jones, [1962] 2 
Q.B. 677 at 686. 
58 Supra note 45. 
59 Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations (Undergraduates)," 
Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 4 at 67. 
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documents necessary for an appeal.Go The University of British 
Columbia places an onus to disclose on the student; all medical or 
emotional problems must be reported to the Dean of the relevant 
Faculty. Untimely notification will be taken into account when de-
ciding a student's appeal.GI This regulation seems particularly and 
needlessly intrusive into the private aspects of a student's life. 
iii. Right to a Hearing 
In Re Po/ten it was decided that natural justice in universities does 
"not always require a formal hearing, or the presence of the appel-
lant, provided his [sic] case is presented ... by way of correspon-
dence, briefs, memoranda or otherwise. "G2 Other aspects of natural 
justice may presuppose that the student is present at the hearing; if 
his or her presence is required to make a proper response, if it is a 
situation in which counsel is permitted, or if a credibility issue re-
quires that a right of cross-examination be given. Certainly, by the 
time an appeal reaches Senate level, the presence of the appellant is 
a requirement of natural justice.G3 
In terms of the right to a hearing, most universities permit the 
parties to be heard in writing at lower levels and in person at a 
Senate hearing.G4 Variations do, however, exist. The University of 
Alberta and University of British Columbia permit a student to be 
present at all levels in discipline cases.G5 
GO Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," Rule 4(iv)(c), [unpublished]. 
GI University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," 
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30. 
G2 Re Po/ten, supra note 36 at 768. 
G3 Healey, supra note 39. The trial judge held that Healey should have had the 
right to be present and commented: "I have not been shown another case where the 
allegations have been as serious, and the protections afforded as few, as in the pre-
sent case." See also the various university Calendars, many of which set out a right 
to be present at hearings. 
G4 See e.g. Saint Mary's University, "Academic Regulations," Saint Mary's 
University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 11 at 23; University of 
Western Ontario, "Academic Policies and Regulations," University of Western 
Ontario 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30. 
G5 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.8 at 
58; University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," 
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 34. 
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Memorial University specifically provides that in the most se-
rious discipline cases, an accused will have no opportunity to con-
front his or her accusers. The student is not permitted to be present 
at his or her own hearing, and the case for both sides is presented by 
the Chair of the Senate Undergraduate Committee.66 A student at 
Saint Mary's University is permitted to be present at his or her dis-
cipline hearing, but is presumed guilty until proven innocent where 
the alleged offence pertains to an examination.67 At York 
University, just the opposite occurs: a student charged with an aca-
demic offence "shall be presumed innocent until guilt, based upon 
clear and compelling evidence, has been determined by the com-
mittee. "68 
iv. Right to Counsel 
In determining whether a student has a right to appear before a tri-
bunal with counsel, the courts have distinguished between Senate and 
lower level hearings. At lower level hearings, it is not uncommon 
for a student to be permitted a non-lawyer advocate, however, there 
is no indication that this is a right. At Senate (or highest-level) hear-
ings, students are generally permitted legal counsel.69 In rare in-
stances, counsel is permitted at all levels.7° 
v. Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses 
It is generally accepted that there is no right to cross-examine wit-
nesses unless the credibility of the witness is an issue at the hearing.71 
66 Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations (Undergraduates)," 
Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 4 at 67. 
67 Saint Mary's University, "Academic Regulations," Saint Mary's University 
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 19(c) at 24. 
68 York University, "University Policies and Regulations," York University 
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, at 360. 
69 Healey, supra note 39; Miraliakbari v. Dalhousie College and University, 
supra note 15. See also University of Western Ontario, "Academic Policies and 
Regulations," University of Western Ontario 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 
30; University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," 
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, at 29. 
70 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-1994 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.8 at 
57-58. 
7I Hajeev. York University (1985), 11 0.A.C 72 (Div. Ct.); Y.B. v. R. W. et al 
(1985), 16 Admin. LR. 99 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
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This cross-examination must be direct (ie. not through the 
committee) if the witness appears in person.72 Any right of cross-
examination appears to be negatived if the witness does not appear 
personally. The committee is still entitled to consider the evidence 
without cross-examination as there is no power of subpoena in uni-
versity tribunals, 73 and such tribunals are not required to adhere to 
strict rules of evidence. 
Cross-examination is seldom mentioned in university 
Calendars; when it is mentioned, it is usually to qualify it as a lim-
ited right. York University permits cross-examination where a fac-
tual dispute exists;74 Dalhousie University Senate hearings allow 
cross-examination, but give the Committee the option to require 
that it be undertaken indirectly, that is, through the Committee.75 
vi. The Right to Reasons 
There is no mention in the caselaw of a right to reasons for a univer-
sity tribunal's decision. A comment by Dickson, J. (as he then was) 
dissenting in Re Harelkin76 could be inferred as connecting a right to 
reasons with a right to appeal. Dickson, J. asked: "Should Mr. 
Harelkin be expected to [appeal] to the Senate not knowing ... the 
real reason for his expulsion?" This statement was given in the con-
text of a student who did not receive a hearing, but it is arguably 
just as valid where an appealable decision was given without reasons. 
72 Hajeev. York University, ibid.; Healey, supra note 39. 
73 Re Mcinnes and Simon Fraser University et al. (1984), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 708 
(B.C.C.A). 
74 York University, "University Policies and Regulations," York University 
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 356. 
75 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," Reg. 9(a) at iv [unpublished]. 
76 Supra note 37 at 31. 
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Nemo judex in Causa Sua: Bias 
The nemo judex rule is the second major requirement of natural jus-
tice, but the courts have put a very high threshold on it in the univer-
sity cases. The case of Re Schabas et al. and Caput of the University 
of Toronto et al.77 held that where the composition of a body is 
statutorily determined, only a showing of actual bias (as opposed to 
a reasonable apprehension of bias) will suffice. The court found that 
proof that the committee members had heard of the incident in 
question at an earlier meeting did not amount to bias. Bilson et al. v. 
University of Saskatchewan78 confirmed that a lesser standard of 
fairness is to be placed on domestic tribunals, and held that a 
committee's consultation (during the hearing) with the lawyer for 
the university did not produce bias. In order to avoid bias or the 
appearance thereof, several universities have conflict of interest regu-
lations pertaining to who may sit on a committee considering an 
academic appeal or a discipline case.79 Dalhousie University has 
adopted a general rule that no person from the same faculty as the 
appellant may sit on a Senate committee.80 The University of 
British Columbia goes a step further and prohibits any ex parte 
communication between committee members and parties to the 
dispute. 81 The University of Alberta forbids disclosure of a stu-
dent's prior discipline record until the guilt or innocence of the stu-
dent has been determined. Such a record is only relevant with re-
gard to penalty. s2 
This high threshold regarding bias seems to have arisen out of a 
recognition of the "community" nature of a university; universities 
are close communities with a limited number of officials and fac-
77 (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. H.C.). 
78 Supra note 42. 
79 See e.g. University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 57; 
University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," University of 
British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30; York University, 
"University Policies and Regulations," York University 1993-94 Undergraduate 
Calendar at 358. 
80 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," at ii [unpublished]. 
81 University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," 
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar Reg. 2.06 at 29. 
82 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 57. 
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ulty who are qualified to hear appeals. In King,83 the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that university tribunals may permissibly have an 
overlap or duplication of membership at various levels of appeal. 
Paine 84 held that a tenure committee (but not a tribunal) may act 
based on personal knowledge of the appellant, as well as the 
material actually placed before it. 
The Paine case illustrates that the high threshold of bias in uni-
versity cases is problematic. In some of the smaller departments 
and Faculties of a university, it would be difficult to find a faculty 
member who did not know the student appellant personally and did 
not have prior knowledge of the facts surrounding the appeal. A 
recognition of this, while pragmatic, seems to sacrifice procedural 
fairness on the altar of efficacy. How can a student know whether the 
members of a tribunal are acting solely on the material before 
them? How can a student know the case he or she has to meet if some 
of the material the committee members use in their decision-mak-
ing is only in their minds and never disclosed to the student? This 
strikes at the heart of both fundamental principles of natural justice; 
audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. As such, the high 
threshold imposed since King ought to be reconsidered by the 
courts. 
Healef5 gives some indication that the high threshold of prov-
ing bias is in fact under reconsideration. It is the only case in which 
bias was inferred from other evidence. In Healey, the court held that 
since the entire Senate had received transcripts of a previous tainted 
proceeding, a fair rehearing was impossible at that level, even if 
conducted as a de novo trial. As a result, the court intervened and 
ordered that Healey be reinstated as a student. 
Remedies 
If certiorari is granted by the court, it may quash the decision of the 
inferior tribunal. Normally the case will then be sent back to a dif-
ferently constituted tribunal for a re-hearing in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice.86 If such a hearing is pending or is no 
longer possible, an interim or perpetual injunction may require the 
83 Supra note 32. 
84 Supra note 42. 
85 Supra note 39. 
86 Hajee v. York University, supra note 71; Hill v. University College of Cape 
Breton et al., supra note 35. 
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university to re-admit a student.87 A writ of mandamus may issue to 
compel a university to grant a degree, or a writ of prohibition to 
prevent it from acting. 88 Other remedies, such as specific perfor-
mance and damages, are available if the action is framed in contract 
or tort. They are discussed in a later section. 
Conclusion: Judicial Deference to Universities 
Although Healey provides some hope that the courts may begin to 
require a higher level of natural justice in universities, caselaw sug-
gests a general reluctance on the part of the courts to intervene in the 
academic affairs of universities, particularly with respect to alleged 
failures of natural justice. 
Universities have implemented many procedural guarantees that 
could arguably justify the deference of the courts, but a review of 
the regulations of ten sample universities indicates several areas 
where universities have not adequately protected the interests of 
their students. 89 Among them: 
" widespread variance among written policies; 
• guidelines that are extremely vague on procedural 
rights; 
" an unparalleled amount of unreviewable discretion at 
departmental and faculty levels; 
• little or no attention to the requirements of natural 
justice set out by caselaw; 
" reservation of enormous discretion to dismiss stu-
dents for academic or non-academic reasons. 
The majority of the aforementioned regulations pertain to 
Senate level appeals: the tip of the administrative iceberg. Most 
faculties and departments are free to determine their own proce-
dures. This has resulted in a daunting maze of internal regulations 
with even more variety than is present among the universities.90 Of 
the universities surveyed, not one had developed uniform procedures 
for lower-level appeals. 
The lack of uniform procedures becomes important when tied 
to the fact that not a single university surveyed offers a true de novo 
87 Boon v. Newbound and Governors of the University of Alberta (1983), 29 Alta. 
LR. (2d) 131 (Q.B.); Healey, supra note 39. 
88 King, supra note 32; Aylward, supra note 50. 
89 Supra note 3. 
90 Dalhousie University provides an example. 
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hearing at Senate level, unless it is the hearing at first instance.9 1 
Each set of university regulations contains a privative clause of vary-
ing scope. For example: 
0 Queen's University permits appeals on "other than 
academic grounds";92 
• The University of British Columbia regulations state 
that the Senate Committee "has no jurisdiction where 
the sole question raised in the appeal turns on the ex-
ercise of academic judgment by a Faculty";93 
" Dalhousie University's Senate committee may not 
hear appeals involving "a requested exemption from 
the application of faculty or university regulations or 
procedures, except when irregularities or unfairness in 
the application thereof is alleged."94 The procedures 
also specifically state that the Senate committee 
may not second-guess a Faculty with regard to either 
grade assessments or fitness for a profession; the 
remedy for an appeal of this sort is, at most, a re-
assessment or reconsideration by the Faculty respec-
tively; 
0 The University of Alberta permits academic appeals 
to the Senate only where there has been a "miscarriage 
of justice," but the committee is not authorized to 
hear any appeal respecting a grade in an individual 
course, an admissions decision, or a decision relating 
to transfer credits. Discipline appeals are conducted 
as de novo hearings, but are only permitted where 
they pertain to a denial of the offence, or to the 
penalty. Procedural irregularities will not be suffi-
cient to quash a decision unless it deprives either 
party of a fair hearing.95 
9I For example, Dalhousie University has vested all jurisdiction over academic 
discipline in the Senate. See Dalhousie University, "University Regulations," 
Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and Medicine Calendar at 33. 
92 Queen's University, "Code of Conduct and Academic Regulations," Queens 
University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 361. 
93 University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," 
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 29. 
94 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee 
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," at i [unpublished]. 
95 · University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 49, 57-58. 
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Most exclude all appeals except those based on a denial of procedu-
ral fairness at lower levels. An appeal on the merits of the case is 
impossible, particularly with regard to academic judgments. 
The deference that has been accorded university decision-
makers by the courts is based in part on the university being able to 
"correct its own errors" through de novo hearings. As Dickson, J. 
pointed out in his dissent in Re Harelkin, "the normal sort of purely 
appellate function will rarely be seen as capable of curing a breach 
of natural justice."96 Instead, a student appears before the Senate of 
his or her respective institution with the onus of showing that natural 
justice has been denied at the Faculty level. The substantive merits 
of that decision are unquestionable, and an adverse decision at the 
lower level weighs on the student like a stone. Many years of educa-
tion and a potential lifetime in a career often hang in the balance. If 
the student is successful, the most he or she can normally hope for is 
that the Senate will direct an already certain Faculty to reconsider 
the case. 
In defence of universities, it might be said that they have shied 
away from undue formalism, preferring instead to resolve disputes 
quickly, flexibly, inexpensively, and informally. One must recog-
nize, however, that excessive informalism might not be appropriate 
where important interests are at stake. Universities have a virtual 
monopoly over entrance to all of Canada's professions and most of 
the higher education in Canada; an adverse decision at one university 
can virtually preclude further education there or elsewhere. Given 
that the courts defer almost completely to university autonomy, the 
procedural guarantees offered by the universities surveyed do not go 
far enough; in some cases, they directly contradict what minimal 
guarantees the courts have required. 
96 Supra note 37 at 29. 
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III. LIABILITY OF UNIVERSITIES IN 
CONTRACT AND TORT 
When G. H. L. Fridman made his innocuous remark about universi-
ties and students entering into contractual relationships, he may well 
have set off a spate of cases in which students sued a university for 
breach of contract.97 Although it was not a contracts case, the first 
Canadian case characterizing the student-university relationship as a 
contractual one was Re Polten.98 The court cited the Fridman article 
and stated that although the procedural rules of a faculty or school 
have no statutory basis, the student must be taken to have agreed to 
be bound by them upon entering the faculty or school.99 
In construing the terms of the contract between the student and 
the university, the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to imply a term 
that a specific thesis supervisor would be provided. 100 It found that 
such a term was not required to give the contract efficacy. The 
Ontario Divisional Court in Ryan v. University of Ottawa10 1 ruled 
that the university did not breach its contract by failing to permit a 
student who was facing disciplinary charges to withdraw from the 
university as allowed by the regulations. 
In Doane v. Mount St. Vincent University et al. 102 the court ac-
cepted that an action in specific performance could lie against a 
university in order to compel it to award a diploma or degree, but 
held that the plaintiff had not shown her compliance with the terms 
of the contract by passing the course in question. 103 Similarly, in 
Chicoine v. Ryerson Polytechnical Institute104 the court accepted that 
97 Fridman, supra note 4 at 181. It is probably best to view the publication of a 
Calendar as an invitation to treat and the application of a student as an offer 
which the university may accept. This was the construction taken by the court in 
Pecoverv. Bowker (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 20 (Alta. S.C.) in which a student sought 
mandamus to enforce his "right" to be admitted to law school, having satisfied 
the minimum requirements for admission. 
98 Supra note 36. 
99 Ibid. at 754. 
JOO Wong v. Governing Council of the University of Toronto et al. (1992), 4 
Admin. LR. (2d) 95 (Ont. CA.). 
101 (1989), 35 OA.C. 290 (Ont. Div.Ct.). 
102 (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 297 (N.S.S.C. T.D.). 
103 The Doane case turned on the construction of the course syllabus and 
whether both terms of work had to be passed individually, or whether an overall 
passing grade was acceptable. Ibid. at 302-303. 
104 (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 261 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Sm. Cl. Div.). 
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it had jurisdiction to hear a case framed as breach of contract 
because of the Institute's failure to teach a course as set out in the 
Calendar. The Court specifically rejected an analogy to labour re-
lations cases which curb the jurisdiction of the courts where a statu-
tory framework provides for the final settlement of all differences 
between the parties. No such framework exists in university statutes, 
and furthermore, it was the Academic Council under the university 
appeals process that did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate or grant 
damages for such a claim.105 
The first successful breach of contract action by a student against 
a Canadian university came in McBeth v. Governors of Dalhousie 
College and University. 106 McBeth, a law student, sought damages 
from the university because it did not allow her to write a supple-
mental exam until two years after the academic year in question had 
ended. A civil jury awarded her $4647.75 for student loan interest, 
legal fees and loss of business (non-legal), as well as $1688 in gen-
eral damages. While the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court did not consider this a proper contracts case in 
which to award damages for mental distress and overturned the 
award of general damages, the Court did accept that the terms of 
the University Calendar formed the basis of the contract between 
the parties. 
The most recent breach of contract case between a student and a 
university was the 1992 case of Bellv. St. Thomas University. 107 In 
Bell, a social work student was given permission to repeat a failed 
field instruction course upon fulfilling certain conditions, despite 
the fact that the Calendar provided students with the opportunity to 
repeat courses "without special permission." When he was later 
deemed to have failed again for not meeting the conditions im-
posed, he brought an action for damages in both tort and contract. 
The Court held that the university had breached its contract 
with Bell, as set out in the University Calendar. However, the plain-
tiff failed in his action because he had not shown any damages and 
had not asked for an order compelling the defendant to readmit 
him to the course without conditions. While this case confirms that 
an order for specific performance is available to compel a univer-
105 Ibid. at 263-264. There is no indication in the reports as to whether the 
plaintiff was successful at trial. 
106 (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (N.S.S.C. A.D.). 
107 (1992), 97 D.L.R. (4th) 370 (N.B.Q.B.). 
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sity to adhere to the Calendar or to re-enrol a student, it is more 
important for its statement on the availability of damages in such 
situations. 
Here, Bell had claimed tuition expenses for the social work 
courses already undertaken, as well as loss of income calculated 
over twenty years. The court rejected both heads of damage. It did 
not allow the tuition expenses for three years of the social work pro-
gram because the plaintiff had returned to the university and used 
the credits earned toward a Bachelor of Arts degree and therefore 
had not suffered any loss. An important issue with regard to dam-
ages remains open-whether the "value" of a university credit is ob-
tained upon successful completion of the course, or whether the value 
depends on putting the credit to some other use, such as transfer 
credits or the acquisition of a degree. It is certainly arguable that 
the whole of a university degree is of greater value than the sum of 
its parts. 
The court also refused to allow damages for Bell's lost wages. 
First, the amount had not been proven. From the decision it seems 
as if the amount claimed was rather arbitrary, so this ruling is not 
surprising. Second, the court held that since the plaintiff may have 
failed the course again, the damages for lost income were too re-
mote. This analysis leaves another question open in that it may be 
possible for a student to claim lost wages where the amount is care-
fully documented (perhaps as before and after degree figures) and 
the plaintiff can show every likelihood of successfully completing 
the degree (such as where the student is expelled for a reason not 
pertaining to low grades). 
In the educational context, very few tort actions have been 
commenced against universities by students. The Wong (1989)108 
case concluded without analysis that there was no tort of educational 
malpractice. 109 The action in Bell v. St. Thomas University1 io was 
framed in negligent misrepresentation as well as breach of contract. 
With regard to the tort claim, the court applied Hedley Byrne111 but 
!OS Supra note 25. 
!09 Wong (1989), supra note 25 at 118-119. The court merely cited the case of 
Hicksv. Etobicoke (City) Board of Education, [1988] O.J. No.1900 (QL), which 
involved a public school. 
110 Supra note 107. 
111 Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 
(H.L.). 
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found that the defendant's mid-term statement that they would 
"consider" allowing the plaintiff to retake the course was neither 
negligent nor relied on by the plaintiff. 
From these few cases it is possible to conclude that a university 
is liable to its students for breach of contract where it fails to abide 
by the regulations set out in the Calendar and other official docu-
ments.112 While problems exist with regard to the proof of dam-
ages, the courts do seem willing to enforce the contract through eq-
uitable remedies such as an injunction or specific performance. 11 3 
Given that the deference accorded universities in judicial review 
does not exist in contracts cases, an action for breach of contract 
would seem to be a promising area for students aggrieved by a uni-
versity's failure to abide by its own regulations. 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION TO UNIVERSITIES 
The curious public/private duality in the status of universities poses 
such a unique problem that the Supreme Court of Canada finally 
had to rule on whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms114 and the various provincial human rights legislation even 
applied to them. 11 5 In McKinney v. University of Guelph, 11 6 a 
mandatory retirement case, Justices Laforest, Dickson and Gonthier 
held that the Charter applies only to "government action." Despite 
112 Such a contract would be more akin to an contract d'adhesion or a standard 
form contract than one freely negotiated between the parties. As such, any clause 
purporting to limit a university's liability to students would be interpreted 
strictly. 
113 Lewis made the point that a court might be more reluctant to grant this type 
of remedy despite the inadequacy of damages where to do so would "force the 
parties to maintain a personal relationship," supra note 1 at 259. However, in the 
few cases that do consider equitable relief for students, the courts do not seem con-
cerned with any similarities a university-student contract might have with 
contracts for personal services. 
114 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
l15 The cases were McKinney, supra note 5, and University of British Columbia v. 
Berg (1993), 102 D.L.R. (4th) 665 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Berg]. Two earlier cases 
simply assumed that the Charter applied to universities: Morgan v. Board of 
Governors of Acadia University et al., supra note 43, and Wong (1989), supra note 
25. 
116 Supra note 5. 
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close ties with government in terms of creation, regulation and 
funding, the long history of autonomy within universities meant that 
they were not "government actors" for purposes of the Charter. 117 
Cases involving human rights legislation have focussed on the 
question of whether universities are in the business of providing ser-
vices "customarily available to the public." 118 In Beattie et al. v. 
Governors of Acadia University et al, 119 American students protested 
their exclusion from a varsity team because of a rule imposing 
quotas on foreign-trained basketball players. MacKeigan, C.J .N .S. 
declined to expand the application of the Nova Scotia Human Rights 
Act120 on the grounds that university services were available to only a 
subset of the public (in this case, those who had satisfied the 
admission requirements), and not to the public generally. 
[The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act] does not ... cover 
all types of discrimination or cover all places in which 
banned types of discrimination might occur .... It 
would be the unthinkable that any university ... would 
knowingly discriminate .... The fact remains, however, 
that such laudable conduct by the university is volun-
tary.121 
117 McKinney, supra note 5 at 320-443. Justices Wilson and L'Hereux-Dube 
dissented. Both would have found that universities are government actors and that 
the Charter applies in the same way that it applies to community colleges. The 
majority did not entirely close this door, leaving the possibility that some aspects 
a university's work may meet the "control test," thus subjecting that aspect of the 
university's operation to Charter scrutiny. While it seems that an argument could 
be made that the "university as employer" is different from the "university as 
educator," Lamer, C.J.C. did not mention this distinction in Berg, supra note 115 
at 685, and merely concluded on the basis of McKinney that the Charter did not 
apply to universities. 
118 Berg, supra note 115 at 678-679. The current Nova Scotia Human Rights 
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 4, uses the phrase "available to other individuals or 
classes of individuals in society." The Federal Act, and the Acts of seven provinces 
contain some reference to public availability of, or access to, services. The Acts of 
Manitoba and Nova Scotia refer to subsets of the public, and the Ontario Act con-
tains no limiting phrase at all. 
ll9 (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (N.S.S.C. A.O.). 
120 Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11. 
121 Beattie et aL v. Governors of Acadia University et al., supra note 119 at 723-
724. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this matter in May of 
1993, in University of British Columbia v. Berg. 122 Berg, a graduate 
student with a history of depression, was denied two services cus-
tomarily available to graduate students in her department: a key to 
the building for after-hours access, and a rating sheet (like a refer-
ence) to enable her to obtain a field placement. The Supreme Court 
held that the British Columbia Human Rights Act 123 did apply to 
the University of British Columbia. 
The reasoning of the Court seems to be based on three grounds. 
First, Lamer, C.J .C. (for the majority) commented that since the 
Charter does not apply to universities124 and a common law right of 
action for discrimination has been foreclosed by human rights 
legislation, 125 students would be left with no remedy for discrim-
ination if human rights acts did not apply. 
Second, all parties agreed that admissions applications were 
available to the general public, and thus the Act applied to those 
initial procedures; it was the application of the Act to the internal 
workings of the university that was in question. Lamer, C.J.C. re-
jected this distinction entirely, arguing that the legislature could 
not have intended it: 
I would reject any definition of "public" which refuses to 
recognize that any accommodation, service or facility 
will only ever be available to a subset of the public .... 
Students admitted to a university ... become the 
"public" for that service. Every service has its own public, 
and once that "public" has been defined through the use of 
eligibility criteria, the Act prohibits discrimination 
within that public .... 126 
[To maintain such a distinction] would allow such in-
stitutions to frustrate the purpose of the legislation by 
admitting students without discrimination and then 
denying them access to the accommodations, services and 
facilities they require to make their admission meaning-
ful. 127 
122 Supra note 115. 
123 Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, as. amended. 
124 Mckinney, supra note 5. 
125 Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. 
Bhadauria(l981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
126 Berg, supra note 115 at 686. 
127 Ibid. at 685. 
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"Public" was defined by the Court as "all persons legally or prop-
erly qualified."128 
Third, the words "customarily available" were examined as the 
university maintained that it had a discretion as to whether to issue 
items such as keys and rating sheets to students. The Court accepted 
the university's discretion but stated that where the discretion is ha-
bitually exercised in a certain way, it will not avail the university to 
argue that it may deny a service simply because the discretion ex-
ists, particularly where that denial is based on a prohibited ground 
of discrimination.129 
The scope of this ruling was qualified somewhat by the obiter 
statement that just because some activities of a service or facility 
provider are subject to scrutiny does not mean that all are. The 
Court recommended a "relational" approach to determining 
whether the particular services of a provider are subject to the human 
rights legislation. The relational approach looks to the relationship 
between the service or facilities provider and the user of those ser-
vices or facilities; the "public" is that group with which the offerer 
has a public relationship.130 
What the Court was probably making room for in its assertion 
that the Act did not apply to all university activities was program 
"fitness" requirements; that is, the regulatory power of a faculty or 
department to expel an otherwise acceptable student on the grounds 
that the student is unfit for the profession for which he or she is train-
ing. It was important to preserve this route at the time of the case 
because the British Columbia Human Rights Act13 1 did not then 
contain a defence to an allegation of discrimination in the form of a 
"bona fide or reasonable justification" clause. 
It is precisely in this area that the human rights acts of the 
provinces ought to have full application. The similar wording of 
other human rights legislation and similar structure of universities 
across Canada leads one to believe that this case will have general 
application to universities. The impact of excluding the protection 
of human rights legislation from this area of university decision-
making could be considerable. 
128 Ibid. at 687. 
129 Ibid. at 690-691. 
130 Ibid. at 687-688. 
131 Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, as amended. 
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The power of a department or faculty to expel an otherwise 
academically and clinically competent student based on a lack of 
"fitness" for the profession for which she or he is training is a very 
powerful discretion. Given past stereotypes of disadvantaged per-
sons, particularly persons with disabilities, this power could be ex-
ercised based on professional stereotypes or through ignorance of the 
true capabilities of such persons. This would deny disadvantaged 
persons the opportunity to even attempt to become a member of a 
profession. It is accepted that the discretion to declare a person un-
fit for a profession must exist somewhere, but given the enormous 
deference courts have granted to universities in their assessment of 
the merit of students, the discretion ought to be exercised after 
graduation by the relevant licensing body for the profession which 
the student seeks to enter.132 
V. CONCLUSION: 
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
In Kane, Dickson, J. pointed out that "[a] high standard of justice is 
required when the right to continue in one's profession or employ-
ment is at stake." 133 This rule is often cited in cases between a 
professor and a university; Healey is the only case to apply the rule 
to a student. 134 One of the reasons that neither the universities nor the 
courts have been protective of the interests of students is that, unlike 
professors, students are not perceived as having any vested right to 
continue or to complete their educations. As such, the requirements 
of natural justice are seen to be closer to those which pertain to the 
deprivation of as yet unvested rights, or mere privileges, as opposed 
to the deprivation of employment or a profession. 
Perhaps this view of students' interests is correct where their 
continued presence in a program is not at stake, such as with a grade 
appeal or a minor disciplinary matter. Where the expulsion of a 
132 Another reason that estimations of "fitness" are better vested with licensing 
bodies than universities is that degrees are providing increasing professional 
flexibility. It is no longer unusual for a student to obtain a degree or enter a 
profession with no intent of ever practicing. One example is a person who seeks 
an LLB. for use in business as opposed to the practice of!aw. 
l33 Supra note 34. Dickson, J., as he then was, was quoting the rule in Abbottv. 
Sullivan and others, [1952] 1 K.B. 189 at 198. 
134 Supra note 39. 
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student is a possible outcome, this view of the worth of an education 
is now outdated and patently incorrect. 
An undergraduate degree is now almost a precondition to many 
forms of employment. Given the highly competitive nature of uni-
versity programs, a student who has once been removed from a pro-
gram will be unlikely to get another chance elsewhere. In some 
cases, as where a permanent notation appears on a student's transcript 
indicating that he or she has been found guilty of academic dishon-
esty, the student's transcript becomes less than worthless. It brands 
the student with a mark of dishonesty for which there is no pardon. 
The consequences to a student who has been expelled from a uni-
versity can be severe, particularly where the student was studying for 
a professional designation. To treat that student as having an interest 
which vests upon graduation from a program rather than admission 
is to lower the standard of procedural fairness in a situation where 
the stakes are obviously high. This is not to say that students should 
never be expelled, just that a high degree of procedural justice 
should be required where foreclosure of an education is a possibil-
ity. 
The court is the proper forum to monitor and ultimately decide 
what natural justice requires of universities in their dealings with 
students. It must be possible for the courts to defer to the unique 
expertise of universities in the evaluation of students, to respect the 
precious autonomy of these institutions, and at the same time insist 
that universities accord a level of natural justice commensurate with 
what is actually at stake for the student. Universities have great ex-
pertise with regard to education, but very little in the area of natural 
justice. No deference should be shown to a university's interpreta-
tion of what natural justice requires. 
Change should begin with the universities. Regulations and pro-
cedures should be revamped to grant students the same level of natu-
ral justice accorded to a person who may be deprived of his or her 
employment or profession. At the very least, current procedures 
must be brought into line with what the courts have hitherto re-
quired. However, this alone is not sufficient. Change in university 
procedures should include: 
JUSTICE IN THE UNIVERSITY 
" the redrafting of regulations to approximate a 
"complete code" of academic and non-academic of-
fences.135 
• provision for true de novo hearings at the Senate 
level. It is not enough for the Senate to send a stu-
dent's case back to a faculty that has already denied 
the student a hearing in accordance with natural 
justice. If such a denial is found, the Senate should be 
vested with jurisdiction to strike a committee at that 
level, which will hear the matter afresh, on its merits. 
" closer monitoring of individual faculties and de-
partments within a university under newly drafted 
unifor.m codes of procedure. Natural justice re-
quirements should differentiate between actions 
which may foreclose a student's education, and those 
that would not do so. The latter may be left with in-
dividual faculties; the former should be the subject of 
uniform regulations to ensure consistency. 
" procedures for obtaining an independent assess-
ment of a student's academic or clinical merit. 
While a faculty member or members who work with 
a student on a daily· basis may be most qualified to 
judge that student's competence, personal relation -
ships also develop over time. These relationships 
could allow otherwise irrelevant considerations to 
taint a faculty member's ability to judge a student. 
" strict conflict of interest guidelines and a bar on ex 
parte communication at all levels. The current sys-
tem is open to the perception of a monolithic univer-
sity against a single student. Assurances are required 
that the persons appointed to hear internal university 
appeals have no interest in the outcome of the case, 
risk no professional consequences for deciding in a 
student's favour, and are completely indifferent as 
between the student and her faculty. 
• estimations of professional "fitness" independent 
of academic and clinical competence should be re-
moved from the purview of universities and vested 
with the relevant licensing body for the profession. 
Fitness requirements are unusual in unlicensed disci-
135 
l35 The University of Alberta has come quite close to producing such a code. 
See the University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for 
Students" University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar. 
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plines. Where no licensing body exists, regulation 
should be left to either the general laws of the land 
through the legislative and law enforcement branches 
of government, or to market forces. 
• Discretion to pardon or reinstate a student should 
be vested in the Senate of each University. 
Particularly with regard to "convictions" for aca-
demic and non-academic offences, procedures should 
always include some measure of reversibility. 
To revamp the current system of university tribunals and proce-
dures will require a delicate balancing act on the part of the univer-
sities, the courts and possibly the legislatures. Direction can be 
taken from employment law and from the careful balance already 
achieved between the government, the courts, and the self-regulating 
professions. As judges so often remind us, where justice requires it, 
we should not avoid an action just because it is difficult or compli-
cated to carry out. 136 In relation to Canada's universities, some 
reconsideration is long overdue. 
For now, a student aggrieved by a university's decision is best 
advised to seek redress in either the law of contract or through hu-
man rights legislation. Judicial review by the courts is a poor and 
ineffective guarantor of procedural justice in the university context. 
136 This statement is normally made in the context of assessing damages in 
personal injury cases and determining custody matters in family law. 
